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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
entire title, and that no new estate is conferred on the survivor on the death of the spouse. Therefore the tax is a
direct tax upon property, requiring apportionment according to the U. S. Constitution, 20 and is not a tax upon the
transfer of property" which according to the Constitution
requires
merely that it be subject to geographical uniformg
ity .

Morton Klaus
LIABILITY OF AN INFANT PARTNER TO FIRM
CREDITORS-The contracts of an infant, with few exceptions, are not void, but merely voidable. An infant has
a general contractual capacity quite the same as an adult,
but protection is extended by affording him a personal opportunity to avoid obligations which otherwise would be
binding.'
An infant may become a partner, and, as in other contracts, the partnership agreement is voidable at the option
of the infant.2 However, the infant's liability is rendered
somewhat peculiar and is not the same as in ordinary contracts,
By weight of authority, an infant who has contributed
property to the firm upon becoming a member, may not
withdraw his contribution so as to jeopardize firm creditors; although he may exempt himself from personal liability by repudiating his contract.' and he thereby frees his
individual estate from attack. A few Pennsylvania cases
have more or less directly passed upon this rule.
Although Dulty v. Brownfield4 is hardly on point, it
was deemed advisable to note it as there is a dearth if
20 Art. 1, sec. 2, Subsec, 3.
21Tyler v. United States, 28 Fed. 2nd 887,
22Art. 1, Sec. 8, Subsec. 1, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41;
Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993. That the same rule should apply
to joint-tenancies, see McIntosh's Estate, Supra.
L31 C. J. see. 149; Gilmore on Part. 79.
231 C. J. sec. 193; Burdick on Part. (2nd Ed.) 94.
831 C. J. sec. 193Y ; 16 A. & E. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.) 287;
Crane and Magruder's Cases on Part. 97; Gilmore on Part. 82; Jennings v. Stannus, 191 Fed. 347, 112 C. C. A. 91; Bush v, Iinthicum, 59
Md. 344; Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 A. 644; Dana v. Stearns, 3
Cush. (Mass.) 372; Whitemore v. Elliott, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 5J8; Lovell v.
Beauchamp, A. C. (Eng.) 607; Burdick's Cases on Part. 155.
41 Pa. 497.
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adjudications in this state involving an infant partner. In
this case, an action was brought by an indorsee against the
maker of a promissory note payable to the order of a firm.
The court held that the defendant could not interpose as a
defence, the fact that the name of the firm was indorsed
by an infant partner. The case merely decides that a minor
may act as a partner and may perform duties and exercise
rights incident to such capacity.
In Smith v. Eisenlord,5 a mortgage on land was given
by partners, one of whom was an infant, for money borrowed by them for firm purposes. On an ejectment by the
mortgagee, the infant partner pleaded his infancy. The
court entered judgment for the plaintiff for one undivided
moiety of the land and sustained the infant's defence as to
the other moiety. No mention was made of the fact that
the land was held by a partnership. This early case should
not be too seriously considered. At present, under the Uniform Partnership Act,6 property is held by partners as tenants in partnership.
7
In the case of Bixler and Correll v. Kresge and Green,
Kresge arid Green held themselves out to the world as
partners, but by private agreement, Green, an infant, was
Green contributed no property or
in Kresge's employ.
money to the alleged concern, but he signed notes jointly
with Kresge for a stock of store goods, upon which notes
Green paid nothing. The court stated that, being a minor,
he was not subject to legal liability on the notes. This intimates that when an infant partner gives his credit to the
firm by notes, he may still avoid liability. It must be added, however, that the preceeding statement was a mere
dictum. The controversy in the case was not in reference
to the infant's liability. It was a dispute over priority between creditors of the so-called firm and individual creditors of the adult partner on distribution of the property of
the alleged firm and the personalty of Kresge. It was decided that there was no partnership "equity" which would
entitle the creditors of the alleged firm to a preference over
the individual creditors of the partner who was the real
owner of the assets levied upon as the property of the firm.
Quite another problem would have confronted the court if
52 Phila. 353 (1859).
61915, P. L. 19, sec. 8 (1).

7169 Pa. 405 (1895).
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an infant partner had furnished property 8 to the firm and
then sued to withdraw it.
Elm City Lumber Co. v. Haupt9 deals more directly
with the subject under discussion. A firm creditor sued a
partnership of which an infant was a member. The court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment which
bound the property of the firm and the partners personally,
who were of full age, but as against the minor, the judgment was limited to the property of the firm, and did not
bind him personally. This case seems to represent the law
of the state. The doctrine is then evolved that an infant
may not take a share of the assets of the firm, even though
he contributed a portion thereof, if by doing so he would
expose creditors of the firm to loss or injury. He may
exempt himself from individual liability, but as against
firm property, the infant has no higher rights than the adult
partners.
The theory of this anomalous rule is that the firm acquires title to the property put forth into the business venture. Though the courts do not directly adopt the principle
that a partnership is an entity distinct from its members,
and even in view of the express repudiation of this notion
by statutory enactment, 10 it is nevertheless so treated and
sustained by the cases.11 The infant may not reclaim the
property as against firm creditors, he being no longer the
owner.
Samuel Backer
8

The court explained that extending credit is not a contribution
of "property" for the purpose of this question.
950 Pa. Super. 489.
IOU. P. A., 1915, P. L. 19, sec. 6 (1); But see sec. 8 (1).
11
Burdick on Part. (2nd Ed.) 97; Gilmore on Part. 83.

